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RELIGIOSITY AND GENDER EQUALITY.  
COMPARING NATIVES AND MUSLIM MIGRANTS IN GERMANY 
 
Abstract 
In European public debates, Islam is often described as an impediment to gender 
equality. By using data from surveys conducted in Germany, we analyze the role of high 
levels of individual religiosity in explaining Turks’ and Germans’ approval of gender 
equality and the way Turkish and German couples share household tasks. Results 
suggest that for both groups, individuals with strong religious commitments are less 
likely than secular ones to hold egalitarian gender role attitudes. At the behavioral level, 
this correlation between religiosity and gender egalitarianism only holds true for 
Turkish respondents. Furthermore, strong religious commitments contribute to 
generational stability in attitudinal and behavioral gender-traditionalism among Turks. 
However, when explaining Germans’ more egalitarian gender-related attitudes and 
behaviors, religiosity turns out to be just one factor among others – and not a 
particularly important one. Further research is needed to disentangle the different 
cultural and religious aspects of Muslim migrants’ attitudes and behaviors. 
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Introduction 
The religious dimension of migrants’ integration receives growing public and academic 
attention in Western immigration countries. European debates notoriously focus on the 
integration of Muslims. Not unlike Spanish in the US (Zolberg and Woon 1999), Islam is 
publicly conceived as major symbolic boundary distinguishing both Christian and secular 
Europeans from their immigrants (Césari 2004; Alba 2005; Casanova 2006; Koenig 2007). Of 
crucial importance for this symbolic boundary is the perceived incompatibility of Islam with the 
modern principle of gender equality. Alleged violations of this principle belong to the standard 
repertoire of those who ask for less tolerance vis-à-vis Muslim claims for recognition, as 
evinced by recurrent controversies over the Muslim headscarf that is often seen as a symbol of 
female oppression. Given its prominence in public discourse, this presumably negative 
relationship between Islam and gender equality merits close attention. In this article, we 
investigate how high levels of individual religiosity affect gender attitudes and gender role 
behaviour among first and second generation migrants from countries with a predominantly 
Muslim population. In order to grasp the specifics of Muslim religiosity, we compare these 
migrants with a native, predominantly Christian control group. 
We focus on the situation in Germany where increasing public visibility of 
approximately 3 million Muslims is subject to growing controversy. Most of them are of 
Turkish origin, having either immigrated as low-skilled labor migrants during the period of 
‘guest-worker’ recruitment in the 1960s and 1970s, or belonging to the second generation, i.e. to 
those who immigrated as children or were born in Germany. Previous research has shown that 
both Turks in Turkey and Turkish immigrants in Germany do in fact hold substantially more 
conservative gender role attitudes than Germans (see Nauck 1990; Inglehart and Norris 2003; 
Gerhards 2007). However, it has not yet been systematically assessed to which extent these 
traditional orientations are related to the strength of Turkish immigrants’ religiosity and to their 
religious background as Muslims. 
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This research lacuna is at least partly due to data limitations. However, the ‘Generations 
and Gender Surveys (GGS)’, which are based on large samples of Germans and Turks, offer 
new and unique opportunities for the systematic study of the relationship between Muslim 
religiosity and gender equality: They provide information on both groups’ individual levels of 
religiosity as well as on gender attitudes and behaviors, i.e. individuals’ approval of gender 
equality as well as more practical features of gender relations such as the way couples share 
household tasks. 
Using these new datasets, we ask to which extent between- and within-group 
differences in gender-related attitudes and behaviors of Turks and Germans are attributable to 
differences in religiosity. Both groups vary with respect to many other characteristics known to 
affect gender equality such as education, female labor force participation, or broader 
socialization contexts. We thus need to assess the relative extent to which group differences are 
attributable to degrees and contents of religiosity as compared to other factors. Since it may be 
expected that exposure to more egalitarian gender values during formative years attenuates the 
influence of Muslim religiosity, we also need to scrutinize how the nexus between religiosity 
and gender-related attitudes and behaviors changes in the generational succession among 
Turkish immigrants. 
We start with an overview of theoretical arguments and previous empirical findings on 
the relationship between religion and gender relations in general and among Muslim migrants in 
particular. We then present our data and measurements and give a descriptive overview of the 
distribution of our relevant variables for Germans’ and first and second generation Turks’. 
Based on this, we present the analysis of how religiosity impacts on gender-related attitudes and 
behaviors among the groups under consideration. A critical discussion of our findings concludes 
the article. 
Religion and gender in the context of migration: Theoretical arguments and 
empirical findings 
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The intersection between religion and gender relations has long attracted attention among social 
scientists. Within the specific context of migration, researchers have focused on the role of 
gender in religious identity construction among migrants (Alumkal 1999; Amir-Moazami/Jouili 
2006), on female activism in religious diasporas (Werbner 2002), and on the influence of 
religious socialization goals on the transmission of gender-role values in migrant families 
(Idema and Phalet 2007). However, as Cadge and Ecklund (2007, p. 365) argue in their review 
of US scholarship about religion and migration, ‘there are few studies that examine the way 
religion and gender intersect more broadly outside of particular religious organizations’. In 
European scholarship there is a rich literature on public discourses about religion and gender 
(Gaspard/Koshrokhavar 1995 Bowen 2006), but few studies systematically scrutinize their 
relationship on the individual level. 
In the following, we discuss potential hypotheses about the influence of religious 
traditions and of individual religiosity – broadly understood as the commitment to religious 
values and norms – as potential factors for subscribing to more traditional gender role 
orientations and gender related behaviors such as the division of household labor. Doing this, 
we draw on standard paradigms of secularization and assimilation as well as on alternative 
theories of religious culture and reactive ethnicity, assess their prima facie plausibility against 
the background of existing empirical findings on Turkish migrants in Germany, and discuss 
arguments about religiosity’s changing pertinence in the generational succession. 
Religion’s impact on gender attitudes and behavior 
There are many factors that affect gender attitudes and behavior, including most notably the 
degree of societal modernization (Inglehart and Norris 2003, p. 47). Gender attitudes are 
strongly related to individual social background, with the better educated, female, and younger 
parts of the population holding more egalitarian attitudes. Gender behavior – e.g. the division of 
household tasks between men and women, decision making in the household, or couples’ 
money arrangements – is similarly related to partners’ resourcefulness such as income 
differences and life circumstances (Blood and Wolfe 1960, Becker 1981; Treas 1993; Bianchi et 
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al 2000; Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001; Breen and Cooke 2005; Grunow, Schulz and Blossfeld 
2007). Nevertheless, since many of these studies show that an increase in women’s resources 
does not necessarily lead to more equality, people’s gender behavior seems also to be influenced 
by cultural values and social norms.
Within the broad range of values and norms, religious traditions have long been a prime 
suspect for explaining the unequal distribution of power between men and women. Many 
religions regulate the sphere of reproduction, and female sexuality in particular, by linking 
gender to symbolic distinctions between sacred and profane and to ritual norms of purity and 
impurity. In doing so, they tend to legitimize inequalities and hierarchical relationships between 
the sexes both within religious institutions and within broader society (Brinkerhoff and MacKie 
1985).  Individuals with strong religious commitments may therefore be assumed to share more 
traditional gender attitudes and behavior. And indeed, strong religiosity tends to be correlated 
with overall less egalitarian gender role attitudes even after controlling for other individual level 
factors such as education (Inglehart and Norris 2003, p. 670; for ethnic group variation in this 
association see Kane 2000, p. 434).  
Now, standard theories of secularization predict that increasing societal modernization 
contributes to both a decline in religiosity and a decrease in the practical relevance of religion 
and, in both ways, facilitates more egalitarian gender relations. Within the context of 
presumably secularized European societies, it can therefore by hypothesized that migrants from 
less modernized countries with higher levels of general religiosity exhibit less egalitarian 
attitudes than those shared by the majority, other things being equal. 
The stereotypical argument that Muslim immigrants are ill-equipped to adapt to 
Western norms of gender equality, however, does not just refer to their strong religiosity. 
Rather, it assumes that there are also differences in the content of religiosity. There is indeed a 
long-standing literature which highlights denominational variations in attitudes toward women’s 
roles and women’s socio-economic status and family related behavior (Lenski 1963; Porter and 
Albert 1977; Heaton and Cornwall 1989). Islamic discourses and practices such as Quranic 
scripture and the legal rules of shari’a are in particular perceived to entail inherently non-
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egalitarian gender relations (for discussion see Mir-Hosseini 2000). And in fact, Inglehart and 
Norris (2003, p. 47) have found that contemporary Jews, Protestants, and Catholics – along with 
non-affiliated individuals – show higher mean scores on the gender equality scale than 
Buddhists and Muslims even after controlling for individual and societal background variables. 
Whereas religious cultures are here considered to affect the values and norms of most of its 
adherents, one would have to hypothesize a fortiori that Muslim migrants with high degrees of 
religiosity hold more conservative gender role orientations than strongly religious Christians or 
Jews, other things being equal. 
Available empirical evidence on Turkish Muslims in Germany is inconclusive with 
respect to these hypotheses. Previous findings confirm that immigrants from Turkey are 
substantially more religious than native Germans and other groups of former guest workers 
(Frick 2004; Fuchs-Heinritz 2000; for more ambivalent results on girls and young females see 
Boos-Nünning and Karakasoglu 2005). Besides, existing data support the assumption that 
Turkish migrants most of whom come from rather traditional rural contexts and only rarely hold 
higher educational degrees, are overall less egalitarian than natives. There is also some 
preliminary evidence that religiously committed Muslim migrants (but not Christians) are 
substantially less approving of gender equality than secular ones (for high school students see 
Brettfeld and Wetzels 2003, p. 331). At the behavioral level, previous research has shown that 
higher levels of religiosity are related to less female autonomy in Turkish immigrant households 
(Nauck 1985). In sum, however, the existing literature does not reveal to which degree 
traditional gender attitudes and behaviors among Muslim immigrants are best explained by 
either their socio-economic background, their degree of religiosity, or by some particular 
characteristics of Islam. 
Religion and gender among second generation immigrants 
We now turn to the implications of straight-line theories of secularization and assimilation for 
the role of religion and gender among second generation migrants. Higher levels of education 
and labor force participation are usually connected to lower levels of religiosity (van Tubergen 
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2006). Many migrants born in the host society left the educational, social and occupational 
ethnic niches occupied by the first generation and can therefore be expected to be less religious 
than those who immigrated as adults. Changes in the cultural and economic context of female 
migrants in particular (Jones Correa 1998) and exposure to more egalitarian gender norms may 
also alter the practical relevance of religious norms in the generational succession. As life in a 
secular society raises the social and economic (opportunity-)costs of strict adherence to religious 
gender norms, migrants’ religiosity may not only weaken over time, but also become more 
private and ‘symbolic’ (Gans 1994). One would therefore hypothesize that the relationship 
between migrants’ religiosity and their gender attitudes and behaviors differs markedly between 
the first and the second generation. 
However, theories of secularization and assimilation have met considerable criticism. 
Thus, it is claimed that depending on the circumstances in the host society, ethnic ties and 
identities may be maintained or even revitalized among the second generation (Portes and 
Rumbaut 2001, p. 148). These ‘reactive’ forms of identity formation may compensate for a lack 
of social approval and are most likely to emerge in hostile reception contexts marked by 
discrimination and a lack for upward mobility that create the need for alternative sources of 
social status and identity. Since religion is an important foundation of ethnicity for many 
immigrant groups, this should also apply to religious acculturation processes (Greeley 1971). As 
generational persistence may affect both the strength of religious commitments and their grip on 
migrants’ attitudes and behaviors in other, non-religious spheres, one would hypothesize that the 
relationship between religiosity and gender-related attitudes and behavior remains strong or 
becomes even stronger for second generation migrants. 
Again, empirical evidence is inconclusive to decide between these two alternative 
arguments. At first sight, it seems that religiosity is declining in the generational succession, as 
evinced by data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) which show that second 
generation immigrants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia are less religious than first 
generation migrants in terms of indicators such as religion’s subjective importance or attendance 
of religious services (Frick 2004; Diehl and Schnell 2006). However, it is not clear to which 
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extent these changes are merely due to differences in group composition (e.g. age and 
education). In fact, one might well expect that Turkish migrants in Germany follow patterns of 
‘reactive ethnicity’ or at least ‘ethnic maintenance’ rather than of straight-line assimilation since 
they face larger social and cultural distances than other groups of labor migrants such as Italians 
or Greeks. Although second generation Turks in Germany have higher levels of education and 
labor force participation and more contacts with natives than the first generation, their 
structural, cognitive, and social assimilation progresses slower than that of other labor migrants 
(Kalter and Granato 2002; Diehl and Schnell 2006) and they remain subject to negative 
stereotypes (Wasmer and Koch 2003). This may slow down acculturation processes and further 
the maintenance or even reactivation of ethnic and religious identifications and norms.  
Moreover, there is evidence that migrant parents feel a greater need to put more effort in 
the maintenance of cultural heritage than non-migrants. Intergenerational continuity in the 
transmission of religious norms within Turkish families is indeed high, particularly in the 
relationship between fathers and sons (Nauck 1995; 2000). Existing findings also reveal that 
children of immigrant-parents with religious socialization goals hold more conservative gender 
role orientations than children who were raised in a more secular socialization climate. Again, 
this applies particularly to father-son dyads (Idema and Phalet 2007). Empirical research on 
generational change on the behavioral level is so far limited to qualitative studies which suggest 
that religion has indeed changed its meaning for second generation Muslim migrants. 
Supposedly, Turkish women who grew up in Germany, not unlike young urban female Muslims 
in Turkey (Göle 1996), draw a sharp line between religious and traditional norms and rules and 
consider the former as a source of identity and emancipation rather than of oppression. ‘Neo-
Muslimas’ tend to choose partners who follow the ‘true Islam’, and even though gender roles 
are still far from interchangeable the asymmetry in the privileges of the sexes is limited (Nökel 
2002, p. 251). There is no evidence, however, about the quantitative relevance of this group.  
This brief outline shows that existing empirical evidence cannot settle the contradictory 
theoretical assumptions about the role of religiosity in explaining gender role orientations and 
Page 9 of 30
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers  ethnic@surrey.ac.uk
Ethnic and Racial Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
10
gender-related behavior of natives and first and second generation immigrants. Therefore, we 
now turn to our own empirical analyses. 
Data and measurements 
The ‘Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS)’ were conducted in 2005 and 2006 at the German 
Federal Institute for Population Research. In two separate surveys, 10.000 Germans and 4.000 
Turks in the age group between 18 and 79 were interviewed on topics such as relationships with 
partners, parents, and children, gender role orientations and family life, religious attitudes and 
socio-demographic characteristics. The survey instrument was the same for both groups, except 
for some additional questions on migrants’ immigration history and their individual integration 
(for data and methods see Ruckdeschel et al. 2006; Ette et al. 2007). In the German sample 
respondents were identified by random route; the survey of Turks was based on a probability 
sample from the local registration offices. Accordingly, only Turkish citizens were interviewed. 
About 20 per cent of all persons of Turkish origin living in Germany, especially those whose 
assimilation is more progressed, have acquired German citizenship during the last decade (see 
Salentin and Wilkening 2003; Diehl and Blohm 2007). Findings can thus not be generalized to 
the whole Turkish origin population in Germany (1). 
The survey covers a broad range of issues and contains several suitable indicators for 
migrants’ gender role attitudes and behaviors and for their religious affiliation and orientations 
(2). In order to measure gender role attitudes, we adapted Inglehart and Norris’ Gender-Equality 
Scale (GES, see Inglehart and Norris 2003) and constructed an index based on five items 
measuring approval of gender equality (3). On the behavioral level, gender equality is measured 
by the division of household tasks between the partners. Gender division of labor is labeled 
‘traditional’ if the female partner is responsible for typical women’s tasks (doing the dishes and 
cooking) and the male partner does typical men’s tasks (maintenance repairs and paying the 
bills). All other forms of household division of labor (man does typical women’s tasks and vice 
versa, third party does the work, man or woman does all the work) are categorized as ‘non-
traditional’. 
Page 10 of 30
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers  ethnic@surrey.ac.uk
Ethnic and Racial Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
11
With regard to religious affiliation, the survey distinguishes between self-identified 
Christians, Muslims, others and those belonging to no religion. Individual religiosity is 
measured by three standard indicators: attendance of religious services, approval of the 
statement that religious ceremonies related to the life-cycle events such as weddings or funerals 
are important, and the mentioning of religion as one of the three most important socialization 
goals for children. In terms of Glock’s (1962) seminal statement, these indicators measure the 
public-ritual and ethical dimensions of religiosity, respectively. Cognitive, belief, and 
experiential dimensions of religiosity were, unfortunately, not included in the survey. However, 
even a moderate multi-dimensional concept of religiosity is desirable, when comparing 
Christians and Muslims who vary substantially with regard to the doctrinal and practical 
importance of various dimensions. For instance, religious service attendance, the standard 
indicator for the public-ritual dimension of religiosity, has very different meanings within 
Christian and Islamic traditions and, as our data show, it is also less important for Muslim 
women than for men. To measure strong religious commitment, we therefore used a composite 
index that takes group specific manifestations of religiosity into account. Thus, we code all 
those respondents as ‘religious’ who display strong religious commitments according to at least 
two of the three indicators mentioned above (attendance of religious services at least once a 
week; agreement that religious ceremonies are important; religion mentioned as one of the three 
most important socialization goals out of a list of eleven).  
As outlined above, relevant social background variables need to be taken into account 
when assessing the relative impact of religion on gender-related attitudes and behavior. Age, 
sex, and family status (married or cohabiting with partner versus living alone) are thus included 
in the analyses. As indicators for respondents’ resourcefulness individual level variables such as 
education (CASMIN classification, recoded into low for those who completed no school or 
basic education versus high for all others) (4), employment status (full/part time employment or 
unemployment versus not employed or retired), and the presence of children are added. 
Additional indicators for partner’s resourcefulness on the household level are the age 
differences between the partners (female more than three years younger than male versus female 
Page 11 of 30
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers  ethnic@surrey.ac.uk
Ethnic and Racial Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
12
about the same age than male or older) and the employments status of the couple (only one 
partner is employed versus both partners are employed). 
In order to measure respondents’ exposure to the overall more egalitarian gender values 
of majority members, additional analyses for Turks include measurements of their social 
assimilation (Idema and Phalet 2007, p. 85). Since the latter is not measured directly we use the 
language spoken most of the time (German versus Turkish) and – on the household level – the 
origin of the partner as proxies (partner is first generation Turk or Turkish origin versus partner 
is second generation Turk or Turkish origin versus partner has German or other non-Turkish 
origin). 
Empirical findings 
We start out with a descriptive overview of the different variables for first and second 
generation Turks and Germans. We then take a closer look at the relationship between 
religiosity, nationality, and generation. Against this background, we scrutinize the role of 
religiosity in explaining between- and within-group difference in gender-related attitudes and 
behavior of German and first and second generation Turks.  
Gender, religion, and socio-structural background characteristics: A descriptive overview 
The three groups differ substantially in terms of the characteristics under consideration. In 
accordance with much of the existing literature, we find that first generation Turks approve of 
gender equality less often and are less likely to practice an egalitarian division of household 
tasks than Germans. Second generation Turks are right in between Germans and Turkish 
immigrants with respect to the attitudinal aspects of gender equality while on the behavioral 
level the dividing line is still between first and second generation Turks and Germans (see table 
1). 
 
Table 1: Distribution of dependent and independent variables by nationality and generational 
status (means or per cent) 
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The three groups also differ in terms of our most important independent variable, religion. 
Analyses not displayed here reveal that 70 per cent of the Germans claim to be Christians, while 
more the 90 per cent of the Turks identify as Muslims. Of greater interest to our analysis is, 
however, the respective share of religiously committed or ‘orthodox’ persons among the three 
groups. Against the background of existing research of religious affiliation, it should not come 
as a surprise that only 6 per cent of Germans are religiously committed in terms of at least two 
of our three indicators (regular attendance, importance of religious ceremonies, religious 
socialization goals), as compared to 21 per cent of second generation Turks and 27 per cent of 
those Turks who immigrated after childhood. It should be noted here that the religiously 
committed constitute a minority not only within the German population (see e.g. Norris and 
Inglehart 2004, p. 74) but also, in accordance with the ‘polarization thesis’ (Merkens 1997, p. 
63), within the Turkish population. 
Second generation Turks are younger than the other two groups and accordingly less 
likely to be married or cohabiting and to have children. The share of individuals with higher 
educational degrees and the share of those who are employed are larger among second than 
among first generation Turks. Germans, however, are the group with the largest share of 
employed individuals. Those Turks who were born in Germany or immigrated as children speak 
mostly German more often than first generation migrants, probably because they have German 
friends. 
In terms of the indicators for the resource asymmetry within the household, the figures 
show that first and second generation Turks live substantially less often in a relationship in 
which both partners are employed than Germans. Females are about the same age or older than 
her partners in two thirds of second generation Turkish and German couples while this share is 
smaller among Turkish immigrants. In addition, less than 10 per cent of first generation Turks 
have a partner of non-Turkish origin whereas this share is twice as high for second generation 
Turks. The share of those with a partner from another immigrant generation (i.e. first generation 
migrants with a partner who was born in Germany or immigrated at an early age or vice versa) 
is also larger among second generation migrants. 
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Generational change in migrants’ religiosity  
Before turning to the impact of religiosity on gender roles attitudes and gender equality, it is 
worthwhile to take a closer look at generational change in migrants’ religious orientations. 
While bivariate results suggested that there is generational change in religiosity figure 1 reveals 
that this is exclusively due to the different age composition of first and second generation 
migrants. If this is taken into account, second generation migrants are about as religious as first 
generation migrants. 
 
Figure 1: Gross and net differences in religiosity between first and second generation Turks 
and Germans (odds ratios) 
Separate analyses for males and females not presented here show that second generation 
Turkish men are even slightly more religious than first generation males whereas second 
generation women are slightly (though not significantly) less religious than female immigrants. 
Moreover, while the difference between first and second generation Turks disappears after 
controlling for the demographic composition of the groups, the one between Turks and Germans 
becomes larger. If Germans were as young and male as first generation Turks, they would be 
even less religious than they already are. Additional controls for education do not change the 
picture substantially. 
In sum, our findings show that contrary to assumptions of straight-line theories of 
assimilation and secularization, religiosity does not decline in the generational succession, at 
least not when the share of those with strong religious commitments is considered. On the other 
hand, popular statements about a religious revival among second generation migrants are also 
without empirical evidence. 
Religion and the approval of gender equality  
As already discussed, second generation Turks are more approving of gender equality than first 
generation Turks but still less approving than Germans. But to what extent do these differences 
merely reflect group variation in relevant individual background variables? And in how far are 
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they attributable to migrants’ strength or content of religiosity? In order to answer these 
questions, we start out by presenting regression models on the approval of gender equality first 
excluding and then including religion (model I and II). A model with interactions between 
group belonging and religiosity allows us to study the differences in the attitudinal repercussions 
of strong religious commitments for Muslims and Christians and for first and second generation 
migrants (III). Separate models for the three groups accomplish the picture by providing more 
detailed insight into the relative importance of religious commitments, background variables on 
the individual and household level, and – for the Turkish group – degree of social assimilation 
(IV to VIII, see table 2). 
 
Table 2: Approval of gender equality (unstandardized linear regression coefficients) 
The models confirm, first, that Turkish immigrants and, to a lesser degree, second generation 
Turks hold substantially more conservative gender role attitudes than Germans even after 
controlling for individual background variables known to affect these orientations. Furthermore, 
we can see in model II that religiosity has a rather strong negative impact on the approval of 
gender equality. However, results also show that group differences in the approval of gender 
equality remain fairly stable when religiosity is included. Obviously, it is only to a very small 
extent that the nationality gap shown in model I can be attributed to migrants’ religious 
commitment. 
In order to assess if and to what extent the relationship between religiosity and 
traditional gender role orientations is stronger for Muslim as compared to Christian believers 
and for first as compared to second generation Turks we insert interactions between religiosity 
and generation/nationality (dummy variables for religious and non-religious first and second 
Turks and Germans) into model III. Results show very clearly that religiosity has a negative 
impact on the approval of gender equality for all three groups – albeit the overall lower level of 
approval is lower among Turks in general: religious Germans are still more approving of gender 
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equality than secular Turks. Furthermore, generational change towards more egalitarian gender 
roles orientations is limited to secular Turks. 
Separate models for first and second generation Turks and for Germans provide more 
detailed insight into the relative importance of the factors under consideration here. For the 
Turkish group, these models also allow us to look into the role of social contacts with majority 
members who on average hold more egalitarian gender role attitudes. Results show some 
substantial similarities between the groups (see table 2). As we have already seen, the role of 
strong religious beliefs reduces the likelihood to approve of gender equality for each group. 
Furthermore, being female and better educated comes along with more egalitarian gender role 
orientations for all three groups. This is especially the case for second generation Turks and for 
Germans. However, only Turks hold more conservative gender role attitudes when they are 
married or cohabiting and have children. As expected, those Turks who speak German most of 
the time are more likely to approve of gender equality (5). 
In general, the attitudes of first generation Turks seem to be more ‘diffuse’, i.e. less 
explicable by the variables under consideration here (see low model fit). This suggests that 
unobserved heterogeneity with regard to factors related to the country of origin, e.g. urban 
versus rural background, might play an important role for this group. 
Religion and gender-related behavior 
We now turn to the impact of religion on gender-related behavior. Here, we limit our analyses to 
cohabiting and/or married couples and look into the factors that influence how they divide the 
tasks in the household. Apart from that, we run similar models to the ones presented in the last 
section. 
 
Table 3: Non-traditional division of household tasks (logistic regression coefficients) 
The models displayed in table 3 show that Germans are much more likely to share household 
tasks in an egalitarian manner than Turks, whereas there is no significant difference between 
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first and second generation Turks when background variables on the individual and household 
level are taken into account. The sizeable difference between Germans and Turks is partly due 
to the fact that both first and second generation Turks included in the analyses on the household 
level are a somewhat selective subsample. As we already saw in the previous section, Turks 
who are married or cohabiting are considerably more conservative than singles whereas the 
difference between married and single Germans is very small. Accordingly, if this selectivity in 
the subsample considered here was taken into account, the differences between Germans and 
Turks would most likely diminish whereas the ones between first and second generation would 
remain rather stable. 
The model including religiosity shows once more that the differences between Turks 
and Germans are only marginally attributable to differences in both groups’ level of religiosity 
(see rather stable group coefficients in model II as compared to model I). The group interactions 
that we added in model III reveal an important difference between gender-related attitudes and 
behavior: Religious commitments seem to come along with a traditional division of household 
tasks only for Turks but less so for Germans (the dummy-coefficients for religious and secular 
Germans are rather similar in model III). Furthermore, we can see that the absence of 
generational change in gender-related behavior is mostly due to the fact that second generation 
religious Turks are just as conservative with regard to their gender-related behavior than first 
generation religious Turks while there is at least some generational change for secular second 
generation Turks. 
Again, we present separate models (IV to VIII) in order to assess the relative 
importance of the factors under consideration here for all three groups and look into the impact 
of migrants’ exposure to natives’ overall more egalitarian gender norms. These models confirm 
that religion is negatively related to an egalitarian division of household tasks only for Turks, 
not for Germans. Religious Turks of both generations are less likely to pursue an egalitarian 
division of labor in their household than secular Turks. And again, the influence of religiosity 
seems to be just as strong for second than for first generation Turks (6). The impact of religion 
for second generation migrants is moderated if respondents’ social context is taken into account: 
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Having a partner from a different generation is marginally positively related to more liberal 
gender division of labor for second generation migrants. This effect seems somewhat surprising 
but is easy to explain: Analyses run separately for both sexes show that it is exclusively caused 
by second generation females whose partner migrated from Turkey (first generation). These 
couples are very likely to share household tasks in a non-traditional way which probably reflects 
the better bargaining position of those females who have been living in Germany for longer and 
who often sponsored their husband’s immigration (for a similar finding, see Nauck 1985). 
The positive effects of age for first and second generation Turks show once again that 
conservative young Turks are more likely to live in a relationship than more egalitarian ones 
who may have adapted to the ‘western’ pattern of late marriages. In all three groups, those who 
approve of gender equality are more likely to show a non-traditional division of labor. The 
positive impact of egalitarian gender attitudes is particularly strong for second generation Turks. 
Obviously, ‘cultural’ factors such as religious commitments or gender role orientations matter 
more for Turks than for natives whose gender division of labor seems to hinge primarily on 
factors not considered here (see low model fit for this group) (7). 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have asked to what extent between- and within-group differences of Germans 
and first and second generation Turks in gender attitudes and behavior can be attributed to 
religious commitment. In sum, our analyses establish four key findings. First of all, whereas 
previous research has described the assimilation process of Turkish migrants in Germany as 
comparatively slow but steady, their religiosity seems to be rather stable across the generations. 
This applies at least to immigrants with strong religious commitments – who are a minority 
even within the Turkish population – and particularly to young Turkish males.  
Secondly, our findings suggest that religious individuals hold more conservative gender 
role attitudes than more secular ones among both Turks and Germans – even if relevant social 
background characteristics are taken into account. However, strong religious commitments do 
not affect the division of household tasks among German couples, while this continues to be the 
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case among Turkish couples. Furthermore, the repercussions of religious commitments in 
everyday life are just as strong for those who grew up in Germany as for those who immigrated 
later in life. Turkish migrants’ religiosity thus seems to be less ‘symbolic’ than in the case of 
Germans in so far as its grip on everyday life is tighter. 
Thirdly, we could demonstrate very clearly that in explaining why Turkish immigrants 
hold more conservative gender role orientations and exhibit more traditional ways of organizing 
the household, strong religious commitment is just one among several factors – and not even a 
particularly important one. Even secular Turks are more conservative than Germans with similar 
background characteristics. One might argue that this is just another piece of evidence for the 
strong indirect impact of the Islamic heritage on cultural norms of gender relations even of 
secular Turks. However, existing research suggests caution in drawing such far reaching 
conclusions: populations of many other non-Islamic countries in Southern and Eastern Europe 
have similar traditional gender orientations as Turkey (Gerhards 2007), and parents’ gender 
specific expectations of their children’s involvement in household tasks are rather conservative 
for all labor migrants (Greeks, in particular, see Nauck 2000, p. 369). Clearly, further research is 
needed to assess the relative impact of the Islamic culture and to disentangle it from other 
aspects of migrants’ cultural background. 
Fourthly, despite religiosity's moderate role in explaining gender-related differences 
between Turks and Germans our analyses show that strong religious commitments contribute to 
generational stability in attitudinal and behavioral gender-traditionalism. Only secular second 
generation migrants hold more egalitarian gender role attitudes than first generation migrants, 
and generational change in gender-related behavior – albeit small – is also limited to secular 
Turks. Strong religiosity, or so our analyses suggest, seems to be an effective barrier to 
generational change towards gender equality in attitudes and in everyday life among Turkish 
migrants. 
It has to be emphasized that our findings cannot be generalized to the whole Turkish 
origin population living in Germany. Since naturalized Turks who are often less religious are 
not included in our analyses, the overall level of religiosity for the Turkish origin population 
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might be overestimated (note, however, that naturalization is equally prevalent among first and 
second generation Turks, see Diehl and Blohm 2008). Besides, nationality differences on the 
behavioral level might be somewhat overstated because Turks who live in relationships tend to 
be more conservative than single ones. 
Notwithstanding these reservations, the baseline of our argument is rather clear-cut: 
Religious commitment has considerable influence on gender attitudes of all groups considered 
here, whereas it has repercussions on everyday behavior only for the Turkish population. These 
findings are in accordance with decades of research showing that the religious factor matters in 
the sphere of gender relationships. With regard to the role of Islam in explaining the more 
conservative gender attitudes and behaviors of Turks as compared to natives, however, our 
findings call for a revision of popular and easy-at hand attributions: The large attitudinal and 
behavioral differences even between secular Turks and Germans suggest that the factual 
explanatory power of migrants’ religiosity lags far behind its prominence in public debates.  
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Notes 
(1) Although naturalized Turks were included in the German sample, they were strongly 
underrepresented. We therefore had to exclude them from the analyses. 
(2) The questionnaires are available under http://www.bib-demographie.de/publikat/frame_material.html. 
(3) The four GES items are: 1) On the whole, men make better political leaders than women (agree coded 
low); 2) When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women (agree coded low); 3) Do 
you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary (agree coded 
low); 4) If a woman wants a child as a single parent but she doesn’t want to have a stable relationship 
with a man, do you approve or disapprove? (disapprove coded low). The fifth item was not in the original 
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GES: 5) Taking care of household and children is just as satisfying as to work for money (agree coded 
low). 
(4) This was necessary due to the large differences between the groups. Most first generation Turks have 
no educational degree or have completed elementary education while only a small share of Germans fall 
into this category. 
(5) Note, however, that it is impossible to assess the causal relationship between migrants’ social 
assimilation and their adoption of liberal gender attitudes with cross-sectional data. 
(6) The statistically non-significant coefficients (p=.9) for the second generation are primarily due to the 
small number of cases for this group.  
(7) In analyses not presented here we inserted several indicators that have proven to be an important 
determinant in explaining changes in the gender division of labor over time (duration of partnership, 
marriage-migration, large educational gap between the partners) into the models (see Grunow, Schulz and 
Blossfeld 2007) but this did not increase their explanatory power. Including income differences between 
the spouses was impossible due to missing cases.  
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Table 1: Distribution of dependent and independent variables by nationality and generational status (means or %)
Turks 
1. generation
(n=2721)
Turks 
2. generation
(n=1161)
Germans
(n=8594)
dependent variable (individual level)
gender index (means)* 2,5 2,9 3,4
dependent variable (household level)**
egalitarian division of labor 42 45 59
independent variables (individual level)
religious 27 21 6
    attendance at least once a week 28 19 8
    relig. ceremonies very important 38 35 21
religious socialization goals 30 26 5
female 48 45 54
age (means) 42 28 49
married or cohabiting 82 50 62
parent 82 46 67
education: more than basic school 28 49 63
employm. status: employed 41 47 51
assimilation: speaks mostly German 20 49
independent variables (household level)**
partners about the same age/ women older 56 67 65
both partners employed 17 25 42
partner’s origin
   German 9 22
   other generation than respondent 17 39
* Gender index: 1= rejection of gender equality, 5= approval of gender equality
** Cohabiting couples only
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Table 2: Approval of gender equality (unstandardized linear regression coefficients)
All Turks 1st generation Turks 2nd generation German
M I M II M III M IV M V M VI MVII MVIII
group: Turks 1st generation - - - - - - - -
Turks 2nd generation
,185
(,023)
,181
(,023)
-
- - -
-
-
Germans
,731
(,015)
,676
(,016)
-
- - -
-
-
religious
- -,258
(,018)
- -,234
(,028)
-,230
(,028)
-,225
(,048) 
-,209
(,048)
-,299
(,027)
female
,247
(,011)
,242
(,011)
,247
(,011)
,115
(,027)
,133
(,027)
,260
(,041)
,271
(,041)
,272
(,013)
age
-,006
(,000)
-,005
(,000)
-,005
(,000)
-,002 n.s.
(,001)
-,001 n.s.
(,001)
,006 n.s.
(,003)
,007
(,003)
-,007
(,000)
married or cohabiting
-,077 
(,013)
-,071
(,013)
-,078
(,013)
-,174 
(,035) 
-,157
(,034)
-,204
(,055)
-,197
(,055)
-,039
(,014)
parent
-,030
(,014)
-,028
(,014)
-,035
(,014)
-,097
(,035)
-,090
(,034)
-,105 n.s.
(,057)
-,099 n.s.
(,057)
,003
(,016)
education: > basicschool
,261
(,012)
,258
(,012)
,270
(,012)
,182
(,028)
,157
(,028)
,286
(,040)
,268
(,040)
,259
(,014)
employm. status: employed
,136
(,012)
,130
(,012)
,133
(,012)
,090
(,027)
,071
(,027)
,076 n.s.
(,042)
,067 n.s.
(,041)
,125
(,014)
assimilation: speaks mostly German
- - -
-
,234
(,031) -
,148
(,040) -
interactions: 1st gen. relig. Turks - - - - - - - -
1st gen. secular Turks 
- - ,089
(,026) - - -
-
-
2st gen. relig. Turks 
- - -.011 n.s.
(,043) - - -
-
-
2st gen. secular Turks
- - ,276
(,030) - - -
-
-
religious Germans 
- - ,326
(,030) - - -
-
-
secular Germans 
- - ,771
(,023) - - -
-
-
Constant 2,610 2,656 2,540 2,734 2,647 2,617 2,524 3,345
R2 ,32 ,33 ,32 ,08 ,10 ,15 ,16 ,18
N 12053 12053 12053 2607 2607 1080 1080 8366
Note: p<.05 (coefficients significant unless noted otherwise), reference categories in italics, SE in parentheses
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Table 3: Non-traditional division of household tasks (logistic regression coefficients)
All Turks 1st generation Turks 2nd generation Germans
M I M II M III M IV M V M VI M VII M VIII
group: Turks 1st generation - - - - - - - -
Turks 2nd generation
,053 n.s.
(,099)
,052 n.s.
(,099)
- -
- - - -
Germans
,331
(,068)
,285
(,070)
- -
- - - -
religious
- -,251
(,071)
- -,369
(,104)
,-329
(,108)
-,378 n.s.
(,212)
-,219 n.s.
(,224)
-,105 n.s.
(,116)
female
,186
(,048)
,183
(,048)
,180
(,048)
-,225
(,093)
-,103 n.s.
(,098)
,520
(,180)
,548
(,192)
,328
(,060)
age
,005
(,002)
,005
(,002)
,005
(,002)
,007
(,004)
,014
(,004)
,040
(,014)
,040
(,015)
,002 n.s.
(,002)
parent
-,314
(,063)
-,309
(,063)
-,310
(,063)
-,400
(,140)
-,315
(,149)
-,231 n.s.
(,243
-,164 n.s.
(253)
-,292
(,075)
education: > basicschool
-,047 n.s.
(,052)
-,044 n.s.
(,052)
-,037 n.s.
(,052)
-,056 n.s.
(,103)
-,088 n.s.
(,109)
,160 n.s.
(,185)
,084 n.s.
(,195)
-,074 n.s.
(,065)
approval of gender equality
,305
(,039)
,290
(,039)
,303
(,039)
,335
(,075)
,302
(,078)
,399
(,141)
,419
(,146)
,236
(,049)
assimilation: speaks mostly German
- - - - ,229 n.s.
(,127) -
,210 n.s.
(,194) -
female same age or older
,102
(,048)
,106
(,048)
,107
(,048)
,187
(,092)
,167 n.s.
(,095)
,241 n.s.
(,188)
,279 n.s.
(,198)
,048 n.s.
(,060)
both employed
,139
(,054)
,133
(,054)
,140
(,054)
,458
(,123)
,434
(129)
,290 n.s.
(,211)
,329 n.s.
(,226)
,008 n.s.
(,063)
partner’s origin: same generation
German
- - - - ,959
(,203) -
,364 n.s.
(,319) -
different generation
- - - - ,032 n.s.
(,137) -
,384 n.s.
(,209) -
interactions: 1st gen. relig. Turks - - - - - - - -
1st gen. secular Turks
- - ,257
(,099)
-
- - - -
2nd gen. relig. Turks
- - -,160 n.s.
(,188)
-
- - - -
2nd gen. secular Turks 
- - ,319
(,128)
-
- - - -
religious Germans 
- - ,350
(,125)
-
- - - -
secular Germans 
- - ,493
(,096)
-
- - - -
Constant -1,162 -1,093 -1,406 -1,086 -1,517 -2,850 -3,316 -,443
Nagelkerkes R2 ,05 ,06 ,06 ,05 ,08 ,09 ,10 ,02
N 7719 7719 7719 2092 1980 557 516 5070
Note: p<.05 (coefficients significant unless noted otherwise), reference categories in italics, SE in parentheses
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Figure 1: Gross and net differences in religiosity between first and second generation Turks and Germans (odds 
ratios)
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
gross difference net of age and sex net of age, sex and
education
o
dd
s 
ra
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2nd generation Turks
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Note: Differences statistically significant except for 2nd generation net differences (p<.10), reference category: 
first generation Turks
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